Bad science or not science?

By Al Blenney

“All Scotsmen like whusky!”

“Jock's a Scotsman, and he doesna' like whusky.”

“Aye, but then he's nae true Scotsman”

The “No true Scotsman” gambit is an attempt to make an unwanted counter-example to a generalisation irrelevant by defining it as not belonging to the population in question.

In last week's Skeptics newsletter Alex writes “I am keen to deny the status of “science” to the scholarly tradition that typically went by the name of “racial science.” I think this is an example of “presentism” - judging the past by today's standards. Science doesn't operate in a social vacuum and racial science was a reflection of the zeitgeist of earlier times – “We know black people are inferior to white people; let's prove it so all the do-gooders can see it for themselves” or something.

Phrenology – the science of interpreting skull features as indicative of personality traits and human capabilities - was popular in some circles in the early 19th century (although viewed with disfavour by other circles) and is now regarded as something of a joke. But Wikipedia notes that:

“Some scientists believed phrenology affirmed European superiority over other races. By comparing skulls of different ethnic groups it was thought to allow for ranking of races from least to most evolved.”

Phrenology in this space is an example par excellence of “racial science” and rationalists of all stripes would like to characterise it as”not real science” although it is more usually described as pseudoscience. But is it “not real science” because of the cruel justifications that followed from it, or because it is discredited? What if it were true and thereby upheld notions of racial superiority, with social consequences? Would it still be “not real” science?

Consider the theory of phlogiston – a theory of heat. It held wide sway among scientists of the time without much in the way of social consequence, but was superseded – because it was demonstrated to be false. Does that make it “not real” science because it has been discredited? Conversely, consider atomic theory, well established, which led to the development of nuclear weapons with dreadful consequences for many Japanese, and that may yet be the end of us all. Is atomic theory thereby “not real” science because of some of its consequences?

Those of us who love science would love to be able to dismiss the embarrassments in its history by some neat categorisation – pseudoscience, bad science, not real science, not-science-at-all. That this is not easy can be seen by the attempts to pigeonhole various intellectual constructions, which range from those by the Logical Positivists (potential empirical verification should be possible for something to be regarded as science – or 'verifiability criterion of meaning') to the epistemological anarchism of Feyerabend (anything goes!)

The examples I have given may demonstrate that value-laden appraisals of particular instances of a social endeavour (trying to make sense of the world in a systematic way) should probably distinguish between the quality of the research/evidence/peer-acceptance/falsifiability/in-built biases/etc, and the real-world uses to which it is put. Not that the lay people are likely to make this distinction.

I'd like to turn this whole discussion on its head, from an unlikely source, by rejecting the use by anybody of the “no true Scotsman” argument. In Mere Christianity C.S.Lewis says “When a man who accepts the Christian doctrine lives unworthily of it, it is much clearer to say he is a bad Christian than to say he is not a Christian.” And he gives extensive arguments to support this idea.

I'd suggest this cuts Alex's Gordian Knot; the history of science is full of blind alleys explored by some clever people. Blind alleys, seemingly justified at the time, cannot be condemned as “not science”. That some led to justifying bad stuff is a separate matter. Bad science that leads to bad things is bad science. Good science that leads to bad things is still good science (dammit!) and may be criticised on other grounds. Efforts that were poorly done or built on biases, such as those coloured by 19th century racism, can be condemned as 'bad science'. Not 'not-science' – bad science.

I doubt that defenders of excesses in the name of religion would have much truck with Lewis's rejection of the 'no true Christian' argument. But as skeptics we should be able to do better.